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1NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
by  Graham S. Pearson* & Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.    Article IV of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention sets out the obligation for
States Parties to implement the BTWC through appropriate national measures.   Although
some States have enacted such legislation, others have not and the Aum Shinrikyo incident in
Tokyo in March 1995 underlined the importance of appropriate penal legislation both to
implement the BTWC (and the Chemical Weapons Convention) and to criminalise any
development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of such weapons for terrorist or criminal
purposes.  This Briefing Paper reviews the development of the language relating to Article IV
of the BTWC by the four Review Conferences, notes the requirements of the Chemical
Weapons Convention and then addresses the opportunity provided by the Ad Hoc Group
negotiations to strengthen the BTWC through stronger implementation measures.
Article IV of the Convention
2.   The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) requires States Parties to the
Convention to implement this through the requirements of Article IV which are that:
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.
3.  Article IV thus obliges each State Party to ensure national implementation in the broadest
possible terms, as the scope clauses at the end of the Article spell out clearly.   Although the
word legislation does not appear in this Article, the commonest response to this obligation
among those States Parties which have made known any response whatever (and they are all
too few) has been either to legislate in such a way as to give domestic legal effect to the
prohibitions contained in Article I, or to determine on examination of their existing laws that
no further specific legislation is necessary.  National implementation also embraces
government decrees, regulations and administrative memoranda to law enforcement agencies,
but little is yet known of what action, if any, States Parties have taken under those headings.
It is understandable, therefore, that national implementation has come to be identified closely
with the adoption of new legislation.
4.    Such legislation ties the Convention into national legal systems in the clearest possible
way.  It contributes to the strengthening of compliance by expanding the constituency with an
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2institutional interest in the success of the Convention.  It also builds the treaty regime flowing
from the Convention into normative structures at the national level, in the form of rules and
expectations and procedures for upholding them.  These rules, expectations and procedures in
turn uphold their counterparts at the international level.  They shore up the international treaty
regime and help, even if only marginally, to ensure its survival by constituting one more
obstacle which would have to be overcome if the Convention were to come under attack.
Developments at successive Review Conferences
5.    The four Review Conferences up to that held in November/December 1996 have
reinforced Article IV with successive layers of consensually agreed language, as each Final
Declaration built on its predecessor and added new material to the inherited paragraphs.
6.   First Review Conference.   In 1980 the United Kingdom, with Belgian and Finnish
support, persuaded the First Review Conference to invite
States Parties which have found it necessary to enact specific legislation or take other
regulatory measures relevant to this Article to make available the appropriate texts to
the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, for [the] purposes of consultation.1
In 1986 this invitation was repeated, as was the 1980 call
upon all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures in
accordance with their constitutional processes, as required by the Article, to do so
immediately.2 [The words emphasised were added in 1986.]
7.   Second Review Conference.  The Second Review Conference took a modest step
forward in regime-building for strengthening compliance with the Convention on the
foundations of Article IV.  It did so by widening, on the initiative of the then German
Democratic Republic, the range of national implementation actions which were given
international commendation.  After repeating the invitations contained in the 1980 declaration
as indicated above it added a new passage:
The Conference notes the importance of
- legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to 
guarantee compliance with the with the provisions of the Convention 
with the territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party;
                                                
1United Nations, The First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, BWC/CONF.I/9, 21 March 1980.  The intrusive the was deleted when
the invitation was repeated in 1986 (see note 3 below) "for purposes of consultation," the Australian delegation,
in editing the text for the Drafting Committee, having restored the original UK language at the request of its
author.
2United Nations, The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 8–26 September 1986, BWC/CONF.II/13/11, 26 September 1986.
3- legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorised access to and removal of pathogenic or toxic material; 
and
- inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol
and believes that such measures which States might undertake in accordance 
with their constitutional process[es] would strengthen the effectiveness of the 
Convention.3
8.   In 1991 Goldblat and Bernauer reported in their UNIDIR Research Paper prepared for the
Third Review Conference that “very few” States Parties had adopted national legislative or
administrative measures to implement the Convention.4
9.   It was impossible to ascertain just how few had taken up the invitation to send their
legislative or other appropriate texts to the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) - into
which the UN Centre for Disarmament had been upgraded in 1983 - because the relevant file
had been mislaid in New York.5   The United Kingdom proposal in 1980 had specified as the
designated recipient of such texts, for purposes of consultation, the Research and Reference
Collection in the Geneva Unit of the Centre for Disarmament (which could make copies for
the Center's Treaties and Resolutions Section in New York so that duplicate collections could
be maintained in both cities); but at the insistence of the Secretariat this provision had been
dropped during the First Review Conference - regrettably, as it turned out.6
10.    The Netherlands had reported at the Second Review Conference despatch of the text of
implementing regulations to the UN at the time it ratified the Convention (June 1981).7  It
was thought that only four other States Parties had shared their texts in this way, and Goldblat
and Bernauer were able to gather four - the United Kingdom’s Biological Weapons Act 1974,
Australia’s Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976, New Zealand’s New Zealand Nuclear
Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987 and the United States’ Biological
Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.  They reproduced them in facsimile as annexes to their
Research Paper8, together with France’s pioneering law9 of 9 June 1972 which had
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4Jozef Goldblat & Thomas Bernauer, The Third Review of the Biological Weapons Convention: Issues and
Proposals, UNIDIR Research Paper No. 9 (New York: United Nations, 1991), p.22.
5Personal communication, 4 June 1991.
6Nicholas A Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament:  Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force, 1975-85,
(London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) pp. 80-81, pp 136-137.
7BWC/CONF.II/SR.5 (10 September 1986), paragraph 56.   Barend ter Haar (The Netherlands).
8Goldblat & Bernauer, op.cit., pp 62-75.
4anticipated the Article IV legislation of States Parties at a time when it appeared most
unlikely that France would ever accede to the Convention then ready opened for signature.  (It
did in fact accede in 1984).  Belgium’s law of 10 July 1978 also deserves honourable mention
as having been included in extenso in Belgium’s national compliance report for the First
Review Conference, the only text which was sent forward by the States Parties contributing to
that 1979-80 compilation.10  The interesting process by which, over the years 1972-1978, this
Belgian legislation came about has been recounted elsewhere;11 as (by another author) has the
even more protracted legislative process over the period 1973-1989 in the United States.12
11.    Goldblat and Bernauer expressed themselves forcefully on the lack of attention paid by
the overwhelming majority of States Parties to Article IV:
Since each State Party must ensure the observance of the BW Convention on its
territory and anywhere else under its jurisdiction and control, it is imperative that it
take the necessary national measures of legislative, administrative or regulatory
nature.  Such measures must specify the prohibitions and obligations to be observed
by the natural and legal persons of the country concerned, and provide for the
prosecution, trial and punishment of offenders.
The Parties should commit themselves to send all pertinent information and
documentation to the UN Secretariat, as recommended by the First and Second
Review Conferences.  This material, to be distributed to all Parties, might serve as an
incentive as well as guidelines for those States which have not yet adopted the
required national measures.13  [All emphases added.]
12.   Third Review Conference.  The Third Review Conference continued the process of
regime-building in this area, repeating the declarations of 1980 and 1986 and adding to them,
notably, a new confidence-building measure entitled ‘Declaration of legislation, regulations
and other measures’.14  This in effect sought to put into effect the recommendations of
Goldblat and Bernauer.  The new CBM, labelled E, went beyond simply addressing those
State Parties which had legislated or taken other implementing action in this area.  It asked
every State Party to complete a straightforward annual questionnaire answering four
questions yes/no:
- do you have legislation?
- do you have regulations?
- do you have other measures?
                                                                                                                                                       
9Law No 72-467, prohibiting the development, production, possession, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer of
biological or toxin weapons (9 June 1972).
10BWC/CONF. I/4 (20 February 1980), paragraph 30, pp 17-18.
11Sims, op.cit., pp 81-85.
12John Isaacs, Legislative Needs, in Susan Wright (ed), Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass:
The MIT Press, 1990) pp 291-299 and legislative texts appended at pp 406-11.
13Goldblat & Bernauer, op.cit., pp 23-24.
14BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) pp 4-5, p 7.
5- has there been any amendment since last year to your legislation, regulations
or other measures?
These four questions were applied to three areas of policy, requiring twelve yes/no answers
altogether.  The first area of policy was the direct concern of Article IV with domesticating
the prohibitions in Article I.  The second and third were export and import control
respectively, specified as “the export and import of micro-organisms pathogenic to man,
animals or plants, or of toxins, in accordance with the Convention.”  These export and import
controls were of particular concern to the United Kingdom, which successfully proposed their
addition to a CBM which would otherwise have been limited to making more universal and
systematic the invitations issued in 1980 and 1986.
13.   The information-sharing ambitions of the Third Review Conference in this area went
further still.  From 15 April 1992 States Parties, under Confidence-Building Measure E,
shall be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations or written details of
other measures on request to the United Nations Department for [now Center for]
Disarmament Affairs or to an individual State Party.15
Each State Party can now, therefore, request these details bilaterally under the authority of the
Third Review Conference, instead of depending solely upon the circulation of texts made
available to the United Nations.
14.   Fourth Review Conference.  In a book entitled "Strengthening the Biological Weapons
Convention::  Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference",  the contribution16 on Article
IV noted that future regime-building work in this area was likely to consist, at least initially,
of the organization of a coherent international response to the responses elicited by
Confidence-Building Measure E.  How were defaulters (i.e. non-respondents) to be chased
up?  Will those States Parties which conscientiously file a nil return be asked why they have
no legislation, regulations or other measures to report?  Would the annual reminder (through
the annual reporting requirement) serve to encourage more States Parties to legislate in this
area?  Would there be any concerted attempt at ‘quality control’ applied to national
implementation measures?  Had States Parties done enough to ‘criminalise’ BTW-related
activities, whether undertaken by terrorists, ‘rogue’ agencies of governments or independent
operators?  Were they sufficiently vigilant in detecting and investigating suspects?
15.   It was noted that there may also be a loophole to be closed, in ensuring the fullest
possible legal extent to the penal legislation enacted or other measures taken by States
Parties.  The United States already asserts, in respect of an offence under its Biological
Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, “extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offence
under this section committed by or against a national of the United States.”17  In its Final
Declaration the Third Review Conference, having repeated the Convention formula that any
national implementation measures taken in accordance with Article IV
                                                
15BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 3 (27 September 1991) pp 18-19.
16Nicholas A Sims, Article IV:  National Implementation  in Graham S Pearson & Malcolm R Dando (eds),
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference, Quaker
United Nations Office, Geneva, September 1996.
17Section 175(a), reproduced in Goldblat & Bernauer, op.cit., p 71.
6should apply within the territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its
control, anywhere,
the word anywhere (echoing Article IV itself) in this extended formulation, compared with
1986, having been restored at Ukraine’s request, went on to invite (on an initiative of the
United States)
each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with
international law, the application of such measures to actions taken anywhere by
natural persons possessing its nationality.18
16.    This formulation corresponded closely to one drafted for (and now firmly embedded in)
the national implementation provisions (Article VII) of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).  It is not just US legislation that enjoys this wider extra-territorial application; the
German working paper, issued during the Third Review Conference, which describes the new
War Weapons Control Act  of 5 November 1990 emphasised inter alia  that its
penal provisions not only apply in Germany, but also to acts committed abroad by
natural persons possessing German nationality.
The German working paper was of particular interest for its comprehensive account,
foreshadowing the new CBM, of national legislative and administrative measures against
BTW and for its description of an entire regulatory framework, embracing export controls
and the description of lists of pathogens as well as the new, tighter War Weapons Control Act
and its supporting ordinances and schedules.  This example of a full national report could
well set a benchmark for other States Parties to emulate in setting out clearly the national
implementation measures they have taken as a regulatory framework.19
17.    The legislation reported under Confidence-Building E was not, however, at least
initially very extensive or (save in one or two cases) particularly informative.  Fewer than
twenty States Parties had, by 1 June 1992, taken note of this new CBM even to the extent of
ticking a ‘Nothing to declare’ box on the cover sheet; even fewer had completed Form E or
made an equivalent declaration.20
18.    Several respondents were able to report that they had legislated or regulated, or both, in
respect of all three matters with which this CBM was concerned (export controls and import
controls, as well as Article IV domestication of the Article I obligations).  These states
included Australia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
United Kingdom and United States.21  The level of detail varied greatly.  Hungary, The
                                                
18BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) p 4.  The Ukrainian proposal is reproduced at p 20 and the
US proposal at p 21 of BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991).
19Germany, Working Paper: Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany on the Prohibition of Biological
Weapons, BWC/CONF. III/7 (10 September 1991).  The quotation is from p 3.
20UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) and Add.1 (12 June 1992)
7Netherlands and New Zealand offered the titles of relevant laws and regulations, Australia a
three-page description of seven different legal instruments (adding that it was currently
considering the imposition of export controls on dual-use biological equipment as well,
already the subject of non-statutory guidelines) and the United States thirty pages of texts and
supporting documents reproduced in extenso.  Finland, Germany (which had reported fully, as
described above, in 1991), Mongolia and the United Kingdom simply ticked the appropriate
yes boxes, with the UK adding a mention of its Biological Weapons Act 1974 under another
CBM.22  Canada claimed that “Under current legislation, Canada regulates or has the capacity
to regulate” all three matters, but did not expand on that delphic statement, in contrast to the
detail it provided elsewhere in the 52 pages of its CBM declarations.23
19.   Other respondents reported that they had legislation under review and might have more
information to provide later (Austria and Belarus) or reported legislation and regulations on
the domestication of obligations but not on export or import controls (Sweden and
Switzerland).24  Norway reported that both legislation and regulations on export controls
would probably be introduced by the end of 1992; for the other two matters, both legislation
and regulations were already in place.25  Japan, on the other hand, had legislated on
everything except import controls.26
20.    Bulgaria offered a detailed narrative.  This included long lists of pathogenic strains kept
in its national microbial collection and those provided over 1989-1991 to foreign laboratories,
as well as relevant provisions in its domestic legislation and penal code.  It added that these
provisions were currently under examination in the light of other countries’ legislation.27
21.    Although not included in a CBM return, it was the implementing decree issued by Boris
Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation on 11 April 1992 which attracted more
attention28 than the CBM returns proper.  The ukase  implemented the Convention in Russian
law, and allocated oversight responsibility to the Committee on Chemical and Biological
Weapons Convention Problems established on 19 February 1992 under the chairmanship of
Anatoliy Demyanovich Kuntsevich.  This committee had recommended opening secret
military research centres to international inspection and converting them to civilian use.
There were reports of “only half-hearted support” for the ukase from the head of the
Directorate For Protection against Biological Weapons, General Valentin Yevstigeneyev.
                                                                                                                                                       
21UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , pp 19-21 (Australia), p 124 (Germany), p 137 (Mongolia),
p 148 (New Zealand), p 245 (UK), pp 364-394 (US); Add. 1, p 53 (Finland), p 65 (Hungary), p 94 (The
Netherlands)
22UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , p 246.
23UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , p 77.
24UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) , p 25 (Austria), p 181 (Sweden), p 210 (Switzerland); Add.
1, p 23 (Belarus).
25UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII (30 April 1992) p 167 (Norway).
26UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII/Add. 1 (30 April 1992) p 70 (Japan).
27UN Document DDA/4-92/BWIII/Add. 1 (30 April 1992) p 35-37 (Bulgaria).
28Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 16 (June 1992) p 9, pp 18-19; Russia shuns Biological
Weapons, New Scientist (23 May 1992).
8There were also signs of confusion in the Russian press over the extent, if any, to which the
former Soviet Union had gone beyond the limits of BTW activity  permitted by the
Convention.  At least in its headline, Izvestiya  suggested that the Soviet Union had been
violating the Convention and that President Yeltsin’s ukase  was intended to call a halt to
such non-compliance.  Other Russian commentary went further.  According to
Komsomolskaya Pravda, Soviet work on biological weapons had only started in earnest after
the signature of the Convention.
22.   Accordingly the Russian Federation’s CBM returns were eagerly awaited.  Their
continued absence in UN documentation led to intensive negotiations on BTW compliance
issues with London and Washington and eventually to the conclusion in September 1992 of
the Moscow Joint Statement.
23.   A quite different line of development, which was welcomed by the Third Review
Conference under the Article IV section of its Final Declaration although it had little in
common with other national implementation measures, is regional agreement.  By means of
such agreements, States Parties entrench their commitment to the Convention by tying it into
a regional network, rather than (or in addition to) their domestic legal systems; this was what
the conference was invited to recognise as relevant to Article IV.
24.    The event which precipitated this recognition was the agreement reached on 5
September 1991, at Mendoza in western Argentina, by the Foreign Ministers of Argentina,
Brazil and Chile.  Uruguay shortly afterwards acceded to the Mendoza Agreement; and this
noteworthy regional measure, embodying a Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, was formally submitted by the delegations of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay to the Conference, as evidence of the reaffirmation of their
renunciation of BTW (as well as of chemical weapons).  They also circulated a message from
the UN Secretary-General welcoming the Mendoza Agreement.29  Point 7 of the Joint
Declaration announced their “intention to make a decisive contribution to the success” of the
conference and “their willingness to consider ways of strengthening [the Convention’s]
verification mechanisms.”  The same four delegations proposed an extra paragraph at the end
of the Article IV section, which was agreed:
The Conference welcomes regional measures such as the Mendoza Declaration as
well as other initiatives dealing with the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction,
including biological weapons, as concrete positive steps towards the strengthening of
the BTWC regime.30
25.   One of the “other initiatives” welcomed here was (in the words of a Venezuelan
committee paper intended as an addendum to that of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay):
the initiative of the Government of Peru dealing with the renunciation by all members
of the “Rio Group” of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons,
with a view to encompassing all the countries of the region in the future.31
                                                
29BWC/CONF. III/14 (16 September 1991); Secretary-General's message in BWC/CONF.III/15 (16 September
1991).
30BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) p 5, based on the Argentinean-Brazilian-Chilean-Uruguayan
proposal of 13 September 1991 reproduced in BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991) p 22.
9The Rio Group comprised all four Parties to the Mendoza Agreement, plus Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.  Peru had made its proposal in
July.32
26.    A paper on regional CBMs was also submitted to the conference by the six states of the
central European Hexagonale  (Poland having joined the original Pentagonale of Austria, the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia since the Venice Summit
of July 1990).33  The Italian delegation, reflecting the relatively greater enthusiasm in Italy for
Hexagonale  diplomacy, took the lead in securing an extra paragraph at the end of the Article
V section:
Taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, neighbouring States
or States belonging to the same region may also adopt measures that are consistent
with the aims and objectives of the Convention in order to facilitate or complement
the implementation of the decisions of the Third Review Conference with respect to
Article V.34
27.    Regionalism could thus be seen emerging as a new line of development, bridging
Articles IV and V.  It was championed in equal measure by the states of two overlapping
groupings in Latin America and by those of a central Europe newly re-established in a
regional consciousness and self-confidence arising out of the collapse of the East-West divide
in 1989.  It is, however, unlikely that this will ever (in comparison with the main areas of
reinforcement and regime-building under Articles IV and V) be more than a subsidiary line of
development in the overall evolution of the BWC treaty regime.
28.   An analysis of the 41 CBM returns circulated by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs on
22 May 199635 shows that of those States providing more than a single page response to the
CBMs, most States are now using the "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare"
proforma and are also completing the proforma for CBM E.    There is, however, clearly
some confusion as to how to complete the "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare"
proforma as some States complete this, ticking one or other of the boxes for CBM E, then
include as well the CBM E Proforma marking in the affirmative that something has been
amended since last year.   There is in general little if any information provided by any of the
States on the name, title or nature of the legislation or regulations.
                                                                                                                                                       
31BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991) p 20.
32CD/PV. 599 (25 July 1991). Peru proposed to invite the Foreign Ministers of the other ten Rio Group member
states to a conference in Lima in November 1991.   Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No 13 (September
1991) p 16.
33BWC/CONF.III/15 (16 September 1991).
34BWC/CONF.III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) p 12, based on the Italian proposal of 16 September 1991
reproduced in BWC/CONF. III/17 (24 September 1991) p 44.
35UN Document CDA/11-96/BW-III (22 May 1996)
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Analysis of 41 CBM Returns in 1996
States making a short  generally one page return  13
(Belgium, Cyprus, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Jordan, Kuwait, Malta, Papua New Guinea, 
Portugal, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Uganda)
States using the "Nothing to declare" proforma and  checking a CBM E box  20
of these those not completing a CBM E proforma 11
(Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, New 
Zealand, Slovak Republic, Switzerland)
of these those completing the CBM E proforma  9  
on which indicated no change since last year 7
(Belarus, Chile, Czech republic, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Turkey)
on which indicated amended since last year 2
(Republic of Korea, USA)
States using the "Nothing to declare" proforma, not checking a CBM E box and completing
the CBM E proforma  4
(Australia, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden)
States not using the "Nothing to declare" proforma but completing a CBM E proforma 2
(Argentina, Canada)
29.    Increased attention has been paid to the possibility that biological materials may become
attractive to sub–State actors, splinter groups or terrorists.  The incidents in the Tokyo
subway in March 1995 in which the Aum Shinrikyo sect planned36 to place some eleven
small containers of the nerve gas, sarin (GB), on baggage racks or on the floor of subway
                                                
36United States Senate Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations (Minority Staff), Hearings on Global
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:  A Case Study on Aum Shinrikyo, Staff Statement, 31 October
1995.    David E Kaplan & Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World:  The Incredible Story of Aum,
Hutchinson, London, 1996.
11
trains and for these to then be punctured by Aum members to release the sarin, has heightened
international awareness that sub-State actors might seek to use chemicals to further their
aims.   Subsequent reports36 make it clear that the Aum Shinrikyo sect had also been working
on developing biological weapons and was close to completing this by March 1995; it is
reported that they had been working on botulinum toxin and anthrax and had devices that
might be used to disseminate such agents.   The Aum sect also sent a team to Zaire in 1992 to
assist in the treatment of Ebola victims - and it is claimed that their aim was to find a sample
of Ebola virus to take back to Japan for culturing purposes.   The Tokyo incidents show all
too clearly the impact of quite limited chemical contamination and the need to take steps to
counter possible use of chemical or biological materials.
30.   One important counter to such possibilities is the enactment of national legislation to
make the mis-use of biological materials a criminal act.     Some States, such as the UK, have
enacted such legislation:  the Biological Weapons Act  37 of 1974 makes it a criminal offence
within the UK to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain any biological agent or toxin
or means of delivery;  any person shall on conviction be liable to life imprisonment.     The
United States had in 1996 enacted an Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
38 which strengthens the provisions of its Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 and
provides for both the regulatory control of biological agents and the regulation of transfers of
listed biological agents.  Insofar as the regulatory control of biological agents is concerned
this provided for:
(1) List of biological agents -
(A) In General - The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall, through
regulations promulgated  ...., establish and maintain a list of each biological
agent that has the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.
(B) Criteria - In determining whether to include an agent on the list under
Subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall -
(i) consider-
(I) the effect on human health of exposure to the agent;
(II) the degree of contagiousness of the agent and the method
by which the agent is transferred to humans;
III) the availability and effectiveness of immunizations to
prevent and treatments for any illness resulting from the
infection by the agent; and
(IV) any other criteria that the Secretary considers
appropriate; and
(ii) consult with scientific experts representing appropriate
professional groups.
                                                
37Biological Weapons Act 1974, HMSO, 1974 Chapter 6.
38U S Congress,   104th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Terrorism Prevention Act,
Conference Report, Report 104-518, 15 April 1996.
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On transfers, the Secretary of Health and Human Services was required to enact regulations
for:
(1) the establishment and enforcement of safety procedures for the transfer of
biological agents listed .... including measures to ensure -
(A) proper training and appropriate skills to handle such agents; and
(B) proper laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of such agents;
(2) safeguards to prevent access to such agents for use in domestic or international
terrorism or for any other criminal purpose;
(3) the establishment of procedures to protect the public safety in the event of a
transfer or potential transfer of a biological agent in violation of the safety
procedures established under paragraph (1) or the safeguards established under
paragraph (2); and
(4) appropriate availability of biological agents for research, education and other
legitimate purposes.
31.  The proposed39 and final40 rule published in the Federal Register are comprehensive.
Others States are to be encouraged to take similar action to criminalize BW and for the longer
term, thought should be given to seeking international agreement that using or knowingly
aiding in the production, acquisition or use of biological weapons is a crime under
international law41.   Other counters are the preparation of response plans for such incidents
as well as more widespread  recognition of the need to control biological materials to
facilitate the safety of the community and the environment.
32.    An additional impetus to encourage all States Parties to enact appropriate national
legislation was provided prior the Fourth Review Conference by the Declaration on
Terrorism42 agreed by the G7/8 on 27 June 1996:
We proclaim our common resolve to unite our efforts and our determination to fight
terrorism by all legal means.   In keeping with the guidelines for action adopted by
the Eight in Ottawa, we strongly urge all States to deny all support to terrorists.   We
rededicate ourselves and invite others to associate our efforts in order to thwart the
activities of terrorists and their supporters, including fund raising, the planning of
                                                
39U S Federal Register, Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Infectious
Agents, Proposed Rules for Section 511 of Public Law 104-132, Vol. 61, No. 112, 10 June 1996, 29327-29333.
40U S Federal Register, Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, Final
Rule for Section 511 of Public Law 104-132, Vol. 61, No. 207, 24 October 1996, 55190-55200.   U S Federal
Register, Site Registration Fee Schedule and Related Matters for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select
Agents, Vol. 62, No. 71, 14 April 1997, 18134-18135.
41Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Criminalizing BW,  CWCB Issue No 31, 1, March 1996.
42G7/8 Lyon Summit,  Declaration on Terrorism, 27 June 1996
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terrorist acts, procurement of weapons, calling for violence, and incitement to commit
terrorist acts.   Special attention should be paid to the threat of utilization of
nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as toxic substances, for terrorist
purposes.
[Emphasis added]
33.  The G7/8 also decided that a ministerial meeting to consider and recommend further
actions would be held in Paris in July 1996.   The Final Declaration43 of that Ministerial
Conference on Terrorism on 30 July 1996 included as one measure:
18) We recommend to States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to
confirm at the forthcoming Review Conference their commitment to ensure, through
the adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their obligations under
the convention to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of such weapons within
their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere, in order,
inter alia, to exclude use of those weapons for terrorist purposes.
34.    This international determination to combat terrorism was also shown by the final
communiqué and resolutions adopted by the twenty-third Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers44 of the member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference held at
Conakry, Republic of Guinea from 9 to 12 December 1995 which included a resolution on
combating international terrorism which stated inter alia  that:
Expressing concern over the continuation of terrorist acts in all their forms and
manifestations, including those where States are involved directly or indirectly, and
which spread violence and terror and constitute a serious threat to international
peace, stability and security;
Proceeding from the conviction that there is an international consensus on combating
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, eliminating the evils and causes of
terrorism directed against the life and property of innocent people and sovereignty
and territorial integrity of States;
Emphasizing the importance of international and regional cooperation, especially
among Member States, in combating effectively all forms of terrorism;
35.   The first paragraph of the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference used
stronger language about Article IV including specific reference to the need to ensure through
national measures the effective exclusion of any use of biological or toxin weapons for
terrorist or criminal purposes by stating that:
The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV.   It reaffirms the commitment
of States Parties to take the necessary national measures under this Article, in
                                                
43Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, Paris, 30 July 1996: Final Declaration.
44United Nations General Assembly/ Security Council, Letter dated 17 April 1996 from the Permanent
Representative of Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/50/953, S/1996/344, 10
May 1996.
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accordance with their constitutional processes.   These measures are to ensure the
prohibition and prevention of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or
retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in
Article I of the Convention anywhere within their territory, under their jurisdiction or
under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes contrary to the
Convention.   The States Parties recognize the need to ensure, through the review
and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their obligations
under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and toxin
weapons in terrorist or criminal activity.
36.   In addition, arising largely from the proposal made by Iran that the Convention should
be amended to specifically include "use", the Fourth Review Conference agreed in the section
of Article IV an additional specific paragraph reaffirming that use is prohibited:
The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention.
Chemical Weapons Convention
37.    Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) sets out the National
Implementation Measures.   The first three paragraphs detail the general undertakings which
include the requirement for the enactment of penal legislation:
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt
the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In
particular, it shall:
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any
other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from
undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;
(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention; and
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken
anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with
international law.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the
appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the
obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this
Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to
protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States
Parties in this regard.
38.   The Article then goes on in its next four paragraphs to address the relationship between
the State Party and the Organization:
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4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall
designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for
effective liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party
shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the time that this Convention
enters into force for it.
5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and
administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to
information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in
connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such information
and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this
Convention and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality
Annex.
7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the
exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical
Secretariat.
Ad Hoc Group
39.   The mandate for the Ad Hoc Group was determined by the Special Conference of States
Parties to the BTWC held45 on 19 - 30 September 1994 which agreed that:
 "The objective of this Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate measures,
including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the
Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be
submitted for the consideration of the States Parties."
The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) has met during 1995, 1996 and 1997.   In July 1997 the AHG
successfully transitioned to negotiation of a rolling text for the legally binding instrument.
This rolling text was developed further during the September/October 1997 meeting which
saw the appointment of Mr Ajit Kumar of India as Friend of the Chair on National
Implementation & Assistance as well as the introduction of language on National
Implementation Measures into the draft text46.   This draft language in Article X is as follows:
[1. Each State Party  [to the Protocol] shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under [the
Convention and][this Protocol]. In particular, it shall:
[(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any
other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from
                                                
45     United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1 Geneva, 19–30 September 1994.
46      United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/38, Geneva, 6 October 1997.
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undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity; ]
[(b) Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity
anywhere under its control; and]
[(c) Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons
possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere.]]
[2. Each State Party may, where requested, cooperate with other States Parties
and afford [the appropriate form of] legal assistance to facilitate the implementation
of the obligations under paragraph 1.]
[3. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Protocol [the Convention], each
State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority  and shall so inform the
[Organization] upon entry into force of this Protocol for it.   The National Authority
shall serve as the national focal point for  liaison with the [Organization] and with
other States Parties.]
4. Each State Party shall inform the [Organization] of the legislative and
administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.
5. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this
Protocol, shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of people and to protect
the environment, and may cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this
regard.
6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the [Organization] in the
exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the [Technical
Secretariat].
40.    The October 1997 draft rolling text in Article X draws upon Article VII of the CWC.   It
follows the content of the CWC provisions quite closely, although the order of the paragraphs
is different;   for example, safety and environmental protection which appear in para 3 of
CWC Article VII appear in the rolling text as para 5.   There is no counterpart in Article X of
the rolling text to para 6 of the CWC Art VII on confidentiality;   instead, this appears as para
2 of Article IV Confidentiality Provisions of the rolling text.
41.  It will be apparent from the square brackets in the language in the rolling text for Article
X (reproduced above in paragraph 39) that there are differing views as to whether the AHG
should limit itself to implementation measures for the Protocol or should take the opportunity
to strengthen the undertakings in the Convention.   Although this opportunity to strengthen
the implementation measures of the Convention would add to the negotiating burden of the
AHG, it is evident that despite the efforts of successive Review Conferences there is far from
universal enactment of penal legislation to implement the BTWC.   It is our view that as the
mandate of the AHG is "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification
measures, ...to strengthen the Convention", this opportunity should be taken to strengthen the
undertakings in Article IV of the Convention.
Strengthening Article X of the Rolling Text
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41.   It would be useful, as a first step, if the AHG were to strengthen the language of the
rolling text in certain places so that this part of the BTWC Protocol is in every respect as
strong as Article VII of the CWC.   The next four  paragraphs show how this might be done.
42.   Paragraph 1 (c) of Article X does not, as it stands, make explicit the extended reach of
penal legislation.    The rolling text includes the words "including enacting penal legislation
with regard to such activity"  in paragraph 1 (a) but does not extend it to paragraph 1 (c).   It
would be advisable to follow the wording of paragraph 1 (c) of the CWC Article VII which
reads:
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural
persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law.
43.  Such a provision in Article X would accord with the Final Declaration of the Third
Review Conference (see para 15 above).   In 1991 the invitation to "each State Party to
consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, the application
of such measures to actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality"
was new to the BTWC review process.   Hence, perhaps, the qualifying phrase "if
constitutionally possible"  and the use of the relatively weak "consider".    Since 1991,
however, any reason to be tentative has disappeared.   The equivalent CWC obligation has
been approved through the successive stages of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and
UN General Assembly commendation (1992), opening for signature (1993) and entry into
force (1997).   Consequently the BTWC Protocol should have no difficulty in using
comparable language.   Indeed it has every reason to use it, in order to include the roving BW
terrorist of any nationality.   For this and other purposes, States Parties should be encouraged
to review the adequacy of their existing anti-BW legislation, which they should update and
strengthen wherever necessary.
44.   The next five paragraphs of Article X (paras 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) would be rendered as
strong as the equivalent paragraphs of CWC Article VII (paras 2, 4, 5, 3 and 7 respectively) if
two small changes were to be made.   In para 2 of Article X, "Each State Party may, where
requested, cooperate with other States Parties"  would be strengthened by the replacement of
may   by shall.    Although the words "where requested"  are additional to the CWC-derived
language, they neither strengthen or weaken this provision.    In para 5 of Article X, the use of
shall in place of may  in "may cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this
regard."  would also be advisable.
45.   It can be argued that para 5 of Article X also needs strengthening at an earlier point by
changing "shall take all necessary steps"   to language comparable to that in the CWC "to
assign the highest priority".   The strengthened para 5 would then read:
"5. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this
Protocol, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to
protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States
Parties in this regard."
46.  If the rolling text were amended as proposed in the above four paragraphs, and the square
brackets removed, Article X would equate in strength with CWC Article VII.   There is,
however, a strong case for going further and making the national implementation article of
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the BTWC Protocol deliberately stronger than that of the CWC.   There are three arguments
for this.
47.   The first argument follows from the interpretation of BTWC Article IV agreed by the
Fourth Review Conference.   Its Final Declaration (as noted in para 35 above) reaffirmed the
commitment of States Parties to take the necessary measures under Article IV.   Most
significantly, it went on to declare that:
These measures are to ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention anywhere
within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to
prevent their use for purposes contrary to the Convention. [Emphasis added]
It further defined the national implementation measures to be undertaken under Article IV as
those which would:
....ensure... the effective fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention
[Emphasis added].
48.   The term prevention is absent from CWC Art VII but is coupled with prohibition  in
Article IV of the BTWC and in the relevant paragraphs of all four Final Declarations in the
Review Conferences of 1980, 1986, 1991 and 1996.   This in itself is an argument for adding
the word to Article X of the BTWC Protocol.   At present, the rolling text, following closely
the language of the CWC in this respect, prohibits  but does not prevent.
49.   The amendments to the rolling text to achieve this would be to couple the two words in
paragraph 1 (a):
(a) Prohibit and prevent natural and legal persons.....
and to do the same in paragraph 1 (b)
(b) Prohibit and prevent natural and legal persons.....
50.   The criterion "the effective fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention"  is the
most recent collective interpretation placed by the States Parties on BTWC Article IV.  It sets
a very high standard for national implementation measures.   It would therefore be advisable
to incorporate this criterion into the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Article X thus:
1.  Each State Party  [to the Protocol] shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, take all necessary measures of national implementation in order to ensure
the effective fulfilment of its obligations under [the Convention and][this Protocol].
The term  "all necessary measures"  is preferable to "any"  in view of the requirements stated
in the subparagraphs of paragraph 1 and in paragraph 4.  "Any" was used in BTWC Article IV
when no such requirements were conjoined, and should be replaced in the Protocol by "all".
51.   The second argument arises from the experience of the BTWC as a multilateral treaty
regime which has been in force since 1975.   Unlike CWC Article VII, which was drafted as
part of a new Convention, the Protocol which the AHG is negotiating will follow a quarter of
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a century after its Convention.   This has implications for the rolling text.   In the national
implementation measures section of the rolling text, as in others, these implications arise
from the patchy experience of compliance with BWC obligations.  Even compliance with
Article IV has been uneven.
52.   The third argument is simply stated.   If it is accepted that biological weapons present an
even more formidable threat than chemical weapons, then the treaty provisions against them
need to be made even more stronger than those in the CWC against chemical weapons.
53.   For all these reasons, the AHG would be well advised to strengthen the rolling text and
go beyond the level of CWC Article VII in the ways proposed above in paragraphs 49 and 50,
as well as in expanding the National Authority requirement.
National Authority
54.   The present rolling text keeps close to CWC language in its only reference in para 3 of
Article X to the National Authority.   This requires that each State Party must designate or
establish one and inform the BTWC's international organization (assuming that there will be
one) of what it has done.   All that is required of the National Authority in Article X at
present is -- as in CWC Article VII para 4 -- that it "shall serve as the national focal point for
liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties."
55.   It is a fair assumption that the eventual States Parties to the BTWC Protocol will, in
almost all cases, have been party to the CWC since 1997 or 1998.   Consequently most will
have had their CWC National Authority serving as the national focal point for liaison with the
OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) since the entry into force of
the CWC on 29 April 1997.   Some will have had a National Authority in being for even
longer, having designated or established it some time before the CWC entered into force, for
example as an outcome of their ratification and legislation processes.
56.  BTWC States Parties participating in the AHG should therefore be encouraged to draw
on the experience that most of them have been accumulating as CWC States Parties to inform
the National Authority provisions of the Protocol.   They should pool that experience to set
standards of effectiveness for their future BTWC National Authority.
57.   It is clear that the structure and resourcing of each National Authority and its operational
location within governmental machinery are the responsibility of the State Party concerned.
Consequently any proposal for a provision that was excessively detailed would be rejected as
over-prescriptive.   Nevertheless, it would be desirable and advisable to expand the provision
in para 3 of Article X with a set of criteria which every National Authority must satisfy in
order to meet the standards set by the Protocol itself for the effectiveness of national
implementation.
58.   Every National Authority must possess statutory powers of investigation and a degree of
statutory protection sufficient to ensure that other organs of government do not interfere in
the effective performance of its functions.   It must be sufficiently independent of other
agencies within the machinery of government to command the confidence of the Organization
and of the other States Parties, with which it shares responsibility for ensuring full
compliance by all States Parties with their international BTWC obligations.
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59.   Every National Authority needs to retain access to the legislature, for example through
parliamentary scrutiny of regular reports, specified in the legislation under which it is
established and which guarantees its statutory powers.
60.   Each National Authority must be provided with adequate staff and other resources for
the effective performance of its functions.
61.   All the information which demonstrates that these criteria remain satisfied must be made
available as an annual reporting requirement through the Organization to the other States
Parties, and, subject to any confidentiality constraints, to the general public.   National
Authorities should also be encouraged to make additional information available so that States
Parties and the Organization, and as much as possible the public, can be made aware of good
practice in national implementation.     Such an expansion of para 3 of Article X could be
achieved by adopting the following language:
3. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Protocol and the Convention, each
State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority and shall so inform the
Organization upon entry into force of this Protocol for it.   The National Authority
shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with
other States Parties.  Information shall be provided annually by each State Party to
the Organization, to be made available by the Organization to the other States Parties
and (subject to any confidentiality constraints) to the general public, which
demonstrates that the National Authority continues to satisfy all the following
criteria;  namely the possession of:
(a)  statutory powers of investigation and a degree of statutory protection
sufficient to ensure that other organs of government do not interfere in the
effective performance of its functions;
(b)  access to the legislature...
(c)  adequate staff and other resources for the effective performance of its
functions.
Each State Party may, in addition, transmit information to the Organization, to be
made available by the Organization to other States Parties and (subject to any
confidentiality constraints) to the general public, which helps promote wider
awareness of good practice in national implementation of the international
obligations assumed under this Protocol.
Article X of the Rolling Text
62.    If the proposals made in this Briefing Paper were to be adopted, the full national
implementation article (Article X) in the BTWC Protocol, with the minimum of other
changes to the rolling text, would read as follows:
1. Each State Party  to the Protocol shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, take all necessary measures of national implementation in order to ensure
the effective fulfilment of its obligations under the Convention and this Protocol. In
particular, it shall:
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(a) Prohibit and prevent natural and legal persons anywhere on its
territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by
international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to
such activity;
(b) Prohibit and prevent natural and legal persons from undertaking any
such activity anywhere under its control; and
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken
anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with
international law.
2. Each State Party shall, where requested, cooperate with other States Parties
and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of
the obligations under paragraph 1.
3. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Protocol and the Convention, each
State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority  and shall so inform the
Organization upon entry into force of this Protocol for it.   The National Authority
shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with
other States Parties.  Information shall be provided annually by each State Party to
the Organization, to be made available by the Organization to the other States Parties
and (subject to any confidentiality constraints) to the general public, which
demonstrates that the National Authority continues to satisfy all the following
criteria;  namely the possession of:
(a)  statutory powers of investigation and a degree of statutory protection
sufficient to ensure that other organs of government do not interfere in the
effective performance of its functions;
(b)  access to the legislature...
(c)  adequate staff and other resources for the effective performance of its
functions.
Each State Party may, in addition, transmit information to the Organization, to be
made available by the Organization to other States Parties and (subject to any
confidentiality constraints) to the general public, which helps promote wider
awareness of good practice in national implementation of the international
obligations assumed under this Protocol.
4. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and
administrative measures taken to implement this Protocol and the Convention.
5. Each State Party , during the implementation of its obligations under this
Protocol and the Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety
of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with
other States Parties in this regard.
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6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the
exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical
Secretariat.
